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ABSTRACT. Redness is the property that makes things look red in normal cir-
cumstances. That seems obvious enough. But then colour is whatever property does
that job: a certain reﬂectance proﬁle as it might be. Redness is the property some-
thing is represented to have when it looks red. That seems obvious enough. But
looking red does not represent that which looks red as having a certain reﬂectance
proﬁle.What should we say about this antinomy and how does our answer impact on
the contest between realism and subjectivism about colour? I address the issues
through the lens of a representationalist position on colour experience.
1. THE VIA MEDIA
There have always been two pressures operating on us when we think
about colour. One pushes us towards some kind of realism, the other
towards some kind of subjectivism.
Here is the line of thought that favours realism. We see colours as
properties of the world around us. Our judgements about colours are
the product of looking out, not in. We acknowledge that some con-
ditions are better than others for making correct judgements about
colour, that it is better to have a careful look rather than a cursory
one, and that sometimes, after taking a careful look, it is right to
change our minds about something’s colour. Above all, we think of
colour as a property of things in the world to which we are
responding. When X looks red to us, we are in a state that is puta-
tively a causal response to X’s redness and, moreover, a state that
represents that X is a certain way. Something’s looking red to me
does not represent how I am, or how my fellow humans are; it
represents that what I am looking at is thus and so.
These remarks can be thought of as a kind of job description.
Colour is a feature of the world around us, is a property we make
judgements about when we look at objects, is the typical cause of
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something’s looking coloured, is better assessed in some conditions
than others, is the feature that X’s looking red represents X as having,
and so on. If nothing satisﬁes this job description, we should go
eliminativist about colour. We should not embrace subjectivism. We
might make a nod in the direction of subjectivism as a way of
explaining why the world seems coloured. Colour experiences and
dispositions to look coloured would, in this case, be part of an ac-
count of why colour seems to be a feature of our world although in
reality it isn’t: ripe tomatoes are no more red than are red after-
images, but in both cases there is an illusion of colour. If, on the other
hand, some property does satisfy the job description, we should
identify colour with that property. Some hold that a suitable reﬁne-
ment and extension of reﬂectances satisﬁes the job description. If
reﬂectance proﬁle RRP satisﬁes the job description for red, then
red = RRP, and we get a version of physical realism about colour.
The line of thought that pushes us towards subjectivism points out
that our access to colour is via our experience of colour, and that this
is a highly non-accidental fact. The fundamental reason we have for
thinking that ripe tomatoes are red is that they look red. By way of
contrast, we have many ways of arriving at justiﬁed opinions about
something’s shape that are independent of the shape it looks to have –
through the distinctive interaction patterns of shaped objects,
through how the object in question feels, by measuring sides and
angles and putting the information together in the right way, and so
on. Moreover, colour seems to be a property our senses bring to the
world. The physical sciences have no fundamental need for colour in
their explanations. Colour enters the picture in virtue of certain
highly distinctive eﬀects of the physical world on creatures with
certain kinds of structures in their eyes and brains.
It is considerations like these that lead many to hold that a
biconditional like ‘X is red iﬀ X looks red to normal subjects in
normal circumstances’ is, when suitably belled and whistled, a priori.
Indeed, some of the many say that this puts matters the wrong way
around: the a priori status of the biconditional is independently
plausible, and this in itself gives us strong reason to hold some kind of
subjectivist or dispositionalist account of colour.1
Once upon a time I thought that there was a simple way to rec-
oncile these two independently plausible lines of thought.2 It was to
hold, ﬁrst, that colour is a perfectly objective property of the world
around us. Colour is the property that is the typical cause of things
looking coloured and is the property our sense of sight is getting
putative information about when things look coloured. This property
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is an objective property of our world, and may well be some kind of
reﬂectance property if what others tell me is right. And, second, we
should hold that what makes that property colour is, in large part,
what it does to us, especially by way of making things look coloured
in the right circumstances. The same goes for the various colours.
Redness is a perfectly objective feature of the world, being say a
reﬂectance proﬁle we might label RRP. But what makes RRP redness
is in large part what it does to us, especially by way of making things
look red to us in certain circumstances. In consequence, being red can
and should be unpacked in terms of being red for such and such
creatures in so and so circumstances (with ‘real’ colour being anal-
ysed in terms of apparent colour in one way or another). But this is
consistent with redness itself – redness for such and such a creature in
so and so circumstances – being whatever property causes in the right
way things to look red to those creatures in those circumstances.
The illustrative analogy is with poisons. Arsenic is a poison. It is a
perfectly objective feature of our world. No-one is a subjectivist about
arsenic, Berkley aside. However, what makes arsenic a poison is
something about its relation to the creatures it poisons. In consequence,
being a poison can and should be unpacked in terms of being a poison
for such and such creatures in so and so circumstances, and being
‘really’ poisonous makes no sense except inasmuch as it is understood,
in one way or another, in terms of being poisonous for... in ....
We seemed to have an attractive viamedia.Wemight debatemany a
detail but there appears to be a way of looking at the problem of colour
that makes sense of the two separately compelling lines of thought.
I now think this is a mistake. This is because I now think, in the
company of many, that we should be intensionalists or representa-
tionalists about perceptual experience, and if representationalism
about colour experience is right – if what a colour experience is like is
exhausted by how it represents things to be – then the via media is
undermined in a fairly radical way. We must move to a more
objectivist position on colour.
I will make some brief remarks in support of representationalism
but it is a big topic in its own right.3 My main concern is to explain
how representationalism undermines the simple via media I once
found so attractive.
The paper proceeds as follows. I start with what I call the opacity
puzzle. It suggests that we must think of the representational content
of colour experience in a certain way. I then say a little about
representationalism. This puts us in a position to spell out its impact
on the via media. I conclude by explaining the famous biconditional’s
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appeal without resorting to any kind of subjectivism or disposition-
alism about colour; in addition, I respond brieﬂy to a possible rear-
guard action by subjectivists-cum-dispositionalists.
2. THE OPACITY PUZZLE
Although I now think the via media needs to be rethought, one part
of it remains, in my view, all but axiomatic. This is the part about
colour being a putative feature of our world to which we are
responding when something looks a certain colour, red, say. Colours
are the putative causes of certain distinctive perceptual experiences,
and that is a key part of what’s involved in seeing colour and of our
concept of colour.
Equally, it is all but axiomatic that colour experience is represen-
tational. When X looks red to you, you are in a state that represents
that X is a certain way. Typically, you will also be in a state that
represents that X is in a certain location relative to oneself, a certain
shape, and is moving or stationary. To say this is not the same as
aﬃrming representationalism, of course. The claim at this point of the
argument is not that colour experience is exhausted by how the
experience represents things to be – the distinctive thesis of repre-
sentationalism, but that colour experience is essentially representa-
tional, be it exhaustively so or not. Although I accept the stronger
claim, it is the weaker one that is important for spelling out the opacity
puzzle and is the contention that is all but axiomatic, or so I claim.
There is a tension between the causal claim and the representa-
tional claim. The causal claim says that in the normal case it is red-
ness that causes things to look red. Now we know what causes things
to look red – certain physical properties. To ﬁx the discussion, I will
adopt a currently popular candidate mentioned already – a certain
reﬂectance proﬁle, and suppose that the normal cause of something’s
looking red is a certain reﬂectance proﬁle, RRP.4 We can, therefore,
conclude from the causal claim that redness = RRP, and corre-
spondingly that yellowness = YRP, and so on.
The tension comes from the fact that the representational claim
would seem to tell us that being red or redness is the property that
something’s looking red represents things to have. It would seem,
therefore, to follow from the identiﬁcation of redness with RRP that
X’s looking red represents that X has RRP. However, it does no such
thing. If looking red did so represent, we would not have had to do all
that work to ﬁnd out about RRP.
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The situation can be displayed as follows:
(1) Redness or the property of being red is the normal cause of
looking red. (Causal axiom)
(2) The property that looking red represents things as having is being
red. (Representation axiom)
(3) The normal cause of looking red = RRP. (Empirical claim)
Ergo, the property looking red represents things as having is RRP.
(Trouble)
The contrast with shape is marked. Being square is the property
X’s looking square represents X as having. The normal cause of X’s
looking square is being square. No problem. Similarly, moving is the
property X’s looking to be moving represents it as having, and it is
also the property that typically causes X to look to be moving.
It will now be clear why we can be casual about the science.
The trouble would be as bad no matter what the normal cause of
looking red turns out to be, as long as it is some relatively obscure
physical property, as we know it will be. For any obscure P, the result
that X’s looking red represents that X is P is trouble. This is why
there is such a marked contrast with the case of shape perception: we
all know which physical property typically makes things look square,
and that it is the very property that looking square represents things
as having.
3. THREE MISTAKEN RESPONSES TO THE OPACITY PUZZLE
First, it would be wrong to say that the puzzle is simply the old puzzle
about the opacity of belief re-run for representation. Whatever should
be said about the possibility, or apparent possibility, that in a case
where a = b, S believes that a is F but does not believe that b is F,5 we
know that one wrong thing to say is that it is a case where something,
a, has the property of being believed to be F by S, and the same thing,
b, has the property of not being believed to be F by S. To say that
would be to violate Leibnitz’s Law. But our problem is precisely that
we seem to have good reason to hold of a single property – redness –
that it is both how things are being represented to be when something
looks red, and is the normal cause of looking red, and yet we know
that all plausible candidates to be the normal cause are not plausible
candidates to be how things are being represented to be.
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Secondly, some might bite the bullet and conclude that looking
red does, after all, represent that something is RRP, this being a
discovery of colour science. Now there is a sense of representation
that would allow this. There is a sense in which my hair temperature
at t represents the temperature of the air near my head at t by virtue
of typically co-varying with it, but this is not the sense of represen-
tation that concerns us here. We are concerned with the sense in
which perceptual experience represents that things are thus and so in
a sense tied to one’s experience being a kind of open invitation to
believe,6 a defeasible invitation but an invitation that one accepts,
absent defeaters. To this extent we are talking about conceptual
content. When something looks a certain colour to one, very often
the content will be non-conceptual in the sense that one has no word
for the precise shade, but it will be conceptual in the sense that there
is a way things are that one is being invited to accept as how things in
fact are. X’s looking red does not plausibly essentially involve any-
thing that could be described as an open invitation, defeasible or not,
to believe that X is RRP.
Thirdly, it might be suggested that we embrace eliminativism
about colour, indeed that we should see the opacity puzzle – our
argument to trouble from the causal and representation axioms – as a
way to argue for eliminativism about colour. There is no property
which is both the normal cause of something’s looking red and how
looking red represents that something to be; therefore, there is no
such property as red. I think there are two problems with this
response.
The ﬁrst is that it seems too good an argument for eliminativism
about colour. The argument makes no reference to the kind of phe-
nomena that are usually taken to be the basis for eliminativism. There
is nothing about metamers and no reference to whether or not there
are suitable commonalities to be found in objects that look the same
colour in normal circumstances. The argument would work even if
there were simple explanations of things looking coloured in terms of
physical properties that stood in the sameness, diﬀerence and simi-
larity relations we intuitively apply to the colours. The kinds of
considerations often marshalled in favour of the view that the world
is not coloured – for instance, that there is no suitable property in
common to things that look red in normal circumstances that marks
them oﬀ from things that look green, that things that look orange are
not in themselves more similar to things that look yellow and to
things that look red than they are to things that look blue, and so on
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– would not be needed. This is the sense in which we would have too
good an argument for eliminativism.
The second problem comes from what we learn from the famous
reduction of the thermodynamic theory of gases. It is right to identify
the properties of the thermodynamic theory with the appropriate
properties of the kinetic-molecular theory. But we can raise the same
kind of opacity problem for heat and temperature as we did for
colour. The sensation of heat represents that what is being felt is hot.
That which causes things to feel hot is a certain molecular energy
property. But the sensation of heat does not represent (in the rele-
vant, ‘perception’, invitation to believe, sense of representation) that
what is felt has that molecular energy property. Similar remarks
apply to temperature. However, it is wrong to infer from these facts –
which amount to observing that heat and temperature display an
opacity that makes them like colour and unlike shape and motion –
that we should be eliminativists about heat and temperature, that we
should deny that heat and temperature are features of our world.
4. THE DUAL PROPERTIES RESPONSE TO THE OPACITY PUZZLE
4.1. The Example of Heat Suggests a Way of Looking at the Opacity
Puzzle for Colour.
Heat is one of a number of cases where we need to keep track of two
properties where we might have thought that there is only one
property we need to recognise. There is the role that heat plays, and
the property of having a property that plays that role. The distinction
is like that between the property that kills the most – that is, the
property that in fact does the killing, and the property of having
whatever property it is that does the killing. In the familiar jargon,
the ﬁrst is the realiser property, the second is the role property.7 Or
consider the relationship between the grammatical sentences of Jap-
anese and those of English. They have something in common – both
are ‘OK’ constructions in their respective languages, but the con-
structions that are grammatical in Japanese are very diﬀerent from
those that are grammatical in English. The role played is the same,
but that which plays or realises the role played is very diﬀerent. And
when we say that a sentence is grammatical, we can equally be
thought of as ascribing the role property or the realiser property.
I think we should and must say something similar in the case of
colour. Here is a way to look at the diﬀerence between, for example,
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colour and shape, between cases where the properties we track vary
sharply in their transparency. As we evolved, it was important that
our senses kept track of various features of our world. Some of these
features our senses keep track of qua the properties they are, some we
keep track of qua the roles they play. Examples of the ﬁrst are shape,
position and motion. Heat is an example of the second. In the ﬁrst
kind of case, an F experience represents that something is F; in the
second kind of case, an F experience represents that something has
the property playing the F role. In the ﬁrst case, the perceptual
experience represents the property per se; in the second case, the
experience represents the property qua the role it plays (this may or
may not be a purely causal matter).8
We are now ready to look afresh at the opacity puzzle for colour.
Suppose that X looks red to me. There is the property – the redness –
that I am putatively responding to; the property that is upstream
from my experience. But there is also the fact that I see X as very
similar in a striking respect to all the other red things. Moreover, I see
it as very diﬀerent from green things and as more like pink things
than blue things. What is more, these similarity and diﬀerence rela-
tions have, as we might put it, a much higher proﬁle than the simi-
larity and diﬀerence relations in cases like the duck-rabbit. Seeing the
duck-rabbit as a rabbit is a diﬀerent experience from seeing it as a
duck, and the diﬀerence is a matter in part of which similarity class
one sees it as belonging to – the rabbits or the ducks. But we can
isolate an element in our experience that is neutral between the two.
There is a certain shape qua shape, and we know what it would be
like to see that very shape, the one we see either as a duck shape or a
rabbit shape, without seeing it as either a duck shape or a rabbit
shape. In the same way, we have some kind of understanding of what
it is like to be motion-blind in the sense of being able to see an object
as being at diﬀerent places at diﬀerent times without seeing it as
moving from one place to another.9 However, in the case of colours,
we cannot imagine what it would be like to see them without seeing
them as standing in the famous similarity and diﬀerence relations.
Take the relations away and you take away colours as seen features.
We cannot make sense, for instance, of seeing something as red at the
same time as failing to see it as more like pink than green, or of seeing
something as black without seeing it as more like dark blue than pale
yellow, or of seeing something as orange without seeing it as some
kind of mixture of red and yellow.10
In sum, I am suggesting that when we philosophise about colour,
we need to distinguish two properties. The ﬁrst is the property that
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acts on us when something looks, say, red, in normal circumstances,
and which is shared between red things and absent from green things,
and likewise for all the colours. This is the property that is plausibly
identiﬁed with reﬂectances or some suitable generalisation of reﬂec-
tances, if that is how the science turns out. The other is a property of
the ﬁrst property. There are many possible views about the exact
nature of this second property but it will be a property like being
similar to so and so, and diﬀerent from such and such, and being
aﬀected by light in so and so a way etc. and, more generally, the
properties the folk qua ascribe to the colours; the properties we can
know about without the beneﬁt of colour science; the properties
codiﬁed in the colour solid. It will be useful to have a tag for this role
and I’ll use ‘Ro( – )’ for the role played by ‘ – ’. We can think of the
ﬁrst as the realiser property and the second as the role property.
This does not mean that when we see X as red (yellow, etc.), there
is some mysterious duality in how things are being represented to be.
We represent that X has the property, whatever it is, that has the such
and such properties – the properties that make up the red (yellow,
etc.) role. There is one way things are being represented to be,
namely, that of having the property that has such and such proper-
ties. And because such and such properties are precisely those
essential to being red (yellow etc.) – being more similar to pink than
green (being more similar to orange than red, etc.) and all that – the
property that has them is a very good candidate to be red (yellow,
etc.).
Here, then, is how we escape the opacity puzzle. When faced with
(1) Redness or the property of being red is the normal cause of
looking red. (Causal axiom)
(2) The property that looking red represents things as having is being
red. (Representation axiom)
(3) The normal cause of looking red = RRP. (Empirical claim)
Ergo, the property looking red represents things as having is RRP.
(Trouble)
we argue that there is a fallacy of equivocation. We distinguish
redness in the sense of the realiser property from redness in the sense
of the role property, and note that premise 1 is only true as a claim
about the realiser property, whereas premise 2 is only true as a claim
about the role property. This blocks the derivation of the conclusion.
If we call the ﬁrst property redness or red, and the second being red,
red is the possibly disjunctive property that satisﬁes the causal axiom,
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and being red is the property that satisﬁes the representation axiom:
red = the property that plays Ro(red); being red = the property of
having the property that plays Ro(red).11
5. REPRESENTATIONALISM (PROPER)
I said that the experience of seeing something as red represents that that
something has the property that has such and such properties, and I
have been arguing that we need to invoke the realiser-role distinction to
explain how this might be true consistently with what we know about
what makes things look one or another colour if we wish to avoid
eliminativism about colour. But so far I have made no trouble for the
via media. It is representationalism proper that makes the trouble for
the via media. As I said at the beginning, representationalism is a topic
for a paper in its own right but I should, I think, indicate why I ﬁnd it so
attractive and, of course, say how I understand it.
We have been taking as a given that experience is essentially
representational. Representationalism holds in addition that experi-
ence is exhaustively representational, that how an experience repre-
sents things as being exhausts its experiential nature.
Representationalism is not, however, the view that the content of an
intentional state determines its nature qua mental state without
remainder. That doctrine is uncontroversially false. A belief and a
desire may have the very same content – I may both believe and desire
that it will rain soon. Representationalism, as we will understand it, is
the doctrine that it is the content of an experience plus the fact that
the experience represents that that content obtains in the way dis-
tinctive of perception, which determines the experience’s nature
without remainder.
Part of the reason I ﬁnd representationalismappealing is that the live
issue, as I see things, is not between representationalism and the view
that experience is not essentially representational. It is between repre-
sentationalism, the exhaustion doctrine, and the view that experience
has an essential representational element and, in addition, an extra that
contributes to phenomenal feel, on the other. But in the latter case we
should be able to vary the extra without aﬀecting what is represented,
and this we cannot do, or so it seems to me. Whenever someone de-
scribes a case where the ‘feel’ is varied, it seems to me that they thereby
describe a case where how things are being represented to be has
changed.12 Equally, if there is an ‘extra’, we should be able to have it by
itself minus the representation, and that seems to be impossible.
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Another part of the reason I ﬁnd representationalism appealing is
that I ﬁnd accounts of alternatives to representationalism implausi-
ble.13 For instance, some hold that your perceptual state represents
that X is red by having some property distinct from red, red* as it
might be, a property of the experience qua experience, as opposed to
qua object which is a part of the world putatively confronting you.14
This seems to me an implausible multiplication of properties. For,
ﬁrst, I accept the lesson of diaphanousness, the view that the prop-
erties of experience qua experience are the putative properties of what
is experienced, and the putative properties of what is experienced are
nothing more or less than the properties our experience represents
things to have, X in our example.15 When X looks red to me, I cannot
ﬁnd any part of the phenomenology to transfer, so to speak, to X; the
phenomenology is one and all part and parcel of how X itself is being
represented to be. Secondly, the view means that experience is no
longer essentially representational; its nature qua experience is se-
cured by its being red*, and that in itself does not require that the
experience per se ‘says’ anything about how X is. Finally, it is hard to
see how transferring red* amounts per se to representing that X has
some diﬀerent property, red. Or take the experience of X’s looking
square. The puzzle is how the experience’s being square*, a property
distinct from being square, when transferred to X, in and of itself says
that X is square?
6. REPRESENTATIONALISM VERSUS THE VIA MEDIA
According to representationalism, the nature of perceptual experi-
ences in general and of colour experiences in particular are given
exhaustively by the way they represent the world that confronts us
as being. As we said above, representationalism accepts diapha-
nousness, the view that the properties of experience are putative
features of that which is experienced. It follows that representa-
tionalism implies that the conditions on what it takes to be red,
while being imposed by the nature of colour experience, are con-
ditions on how our world is. Subjectivists love to describe scenarios
where they make major changes to the colours things look to have –
they talk of the eﬀects of sodium lamps, what happens at dusk,
inverting colour lenses, of ‘Martians’ who have one more cone that
we do, and so on – and proceed to invite us to concede that the
only non-arbitrary responses to questions about what the real col-
ours are are to let apparent colours determine our assignments of
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colours except in highly deviant cases (the kind of cases where X’s
making someone sick would not show that X is a poison). Of
course, say subjectivists, we can rule that the real colour is the
colour something looks to the typical human in daylight, but the
arbitrariness of this ruling only brings out the truth of the subjec-
tivist cum dispositional message. However, representationalism
about perceptual experience tells us that each apparent colour is a
representational state: each state of something’s looking to have
such and such a colour represents that things before one are thus
and so. It is then a matter for the world whether the things before
one are thus and so; one’s state sets the question but the world
answers it.
Here is a way to put the key point. We can all agree that there is an
intimate link between colour and colour experience. It is no accident
that the way we acquire the concept of colour is through having
things looking coloured to us, despite the fact that other ways are
possible in principle. We got the concept of a quark via its role in
fundamental physical theory but nothing like that happened with red.
We simply latched onto that visually conspicuous property that
confronts us when we see ripe tomatoes, blood and the like. The via
media makes the link between colour and colour experience with non-
deviant causal connections, which means that, at the end of the day,
what gets caused in one is very important for settling the colours
things have, and so we get a subjectivist cum dispositional account of
colour from the via media. However, the representationalist makes
the link with the content of colour experiences, and, because colour
experiences represent things around us as being thus and so, at the
end of the day, what settles whether or not something is red is
whether or not it satisﬁes the condition on how things are around one
given by the ‘thus and so’.
Properties like being uncomfortable as a property of chairs, or
being poisonous as a property of substances are dispositional cum
subjective because a chair’s being uncomfortable is answerable at
bottom to whether or not the chair typically causes discomfort, and
a substance’s being poisonous is answerable to whether or not it
typically causes those who ingest it to become ill. By contrast, an
object’s being red is answerable to whether or not it is as the
experience of looking red represents it to be. In the ﬁrst kind of
case, what matters for having the assigned property is not the
nature of that which is assigned the property; it is the nature of that
which gets caused by that which is assigned the property, plus the
nature of the causal connection between the two – it needs to be
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non-deviant. In the second kind of case, the nature of that which is
assigned the property is crucial; it needs to be as the experience
represents it to be. The reason for the big diﬀerence goes back to
the fact that uncomfortable chairs and poisons cause experiences in
our bodies, experiences that represent that our bodies are thus and
so. But when something looks red to us, the experience does not
represent how our bodies are or how we are. The content concerns
how the thing seen is.
Take, for illustration, the case of Martians who have, on all the
standard tests, much better colour vision than any humans. What do
we representationalists say to subjectivists’ suggestions that this
would merely show that they are better at ‘colour for Martians’ than
humans are; that to say otherwise is like the mistake of saying that
Martians who make many more discriminations on the score of
comfort among armchairs should be employed to settle which chairs
are really comfortable for humans. What we representationalists say
is that there are two cases. One case is where the Martians and we
have the same range of colour experiences. In this case, from repre-
sentationalism, it will be true that how we and they represent things
to be when we have colour experiences coincides. The diﬀerence will
be that they are better than we are at determining when things are as
they are being represented to be. The other case, the one more likely
to be the actual one, is where how Martians are representing things to
be diﬀers from how we are representing things to be. In that case, we
and Martians have diﬀerent colour concepts and mean diﬀerent
things by colour words. If they make every discrimination we do and
more besides, the plausible view will be that their concepts and
meanings are more ﬁne grained versions of ours – theirs’ mark every
boundary that ours do and more besides.
This is a kind of subjectivism but only about concepts and word
meanings, not about the properties we and they are representing
things to have. It is the recognition that the concepts and meanings
are our and their concepts and meanings, respectively. Of course the
point carries across to humans with defective colour vision. If Fred,
a man with serious red-green colour blindness, says that X is red on
the basis of how it looks to him, there are two possibilities. (i) Fred
is seeking to ascribe the property we use ‘red’ for – in which case
there is a good chance he is wrong. (ii) Fred is seeking to ascribe the
property his experience represents X as having – a property which is
wider in extension than the property we ascribe with the word ‘red’,
though he may well not realise this – in which case there is a good
chance he is right.16 The ﬁrst case is one where Fred is likely to be
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wrong owing to bad colour vision. The second case is one where
Fred is likely to be right but right about a diﬀerent property from
the property we are right about (when we are right). Neither case is
support for subjectivist views of colour. What is true, of course, is
that humans are much more likely to be making somewhat diﬀerent
claims about how things are when they use colour terms than is the
case when they are using terms for shape and motion. Humans can
have diﬀerent concepts of red much more easily than diﬀerent
concepts of square. If you and I diﬀer in the shape we use ‘square’
for, the diﬀerence will likely show up because shape matters con-
spicuously for how things move through space, and because there
are agreed ways of measuring shape. But it is notorious that you
and I can diﬀer markedly in ability to discriminate colours without
realising that we do and, according to representationalism, this will
typically correspond with our having somewhat diﬀerent colour
concepts.
We can sum this up as follows. The via media says that (i) for X to
be red is for X to have the objective property that normally causes
things to look red, and (ii) that redness is that objective property. The
representationalist alternative says that (i) for X to be red is for X to
have the objective property that satisﬁes Ro(red), and (ii) that redness
is that objective property. What’s the big diﬀerence? The condition
set by Ro(red) concerns how the world needs to be for something to
be red, not how subject’s have to be. It concerns how the world is
being represented to be when something looks red, not how subjects
are or would be. On the via media, the role is to be a typical cause of
looking red; on the representationalist alternative, the role is to be as
looking red represents things to be.
Having emphasised the non-subjective nature of the representa-
tionalist alternative, we should note that there is a kind semantic
subjectivism in the representationalist alternative. Reﬂectances are
not obvious features of our world. Still less obvious are the various
relations they stand in. The same goes for any of the at all plausible
candidates that physical realists might suggest for identiﬁcation with
the colours. This means that, though we could in principle have
noted the relevant properties and roles they play – the roles we’ve
used ‘Ro ( – )’ for – without the beneﬁt of colour vision, in practice
we have to latch onto the properties and patterns in the ﬁrst place
via things looking coloured to us. In practice, we had no alternative
but to acquire the words and the concepts via having the various
colour experiences. The word ‘red’ gets into English because
English speakers have looking-red experiences and this is a highly
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non-accidental fact. This, though, does not mean that being red and
being disposed to look red go hand in hand. We might have ac-
quired the word and the concept through the machinations of brain
scientists in a world where there were objects that were as looking
red represents them to be but which, for one reason or another, did
not normally cause things to look red. On the representationalist
alternative, these objects would be red despite not being disposed to
look red.
7. SUBJECTIVISM BY THE BACK DOOR?
I made the distinction between the via media and the representa-
tionalist alternative by emphasising that the condition set by Ro(red)
concerns how the world needs to be for something to be red, not how
subject’s have to be. The key point is that colour experiences repre-
sent how the world is, not how we are or would be. But it might be
objected that this is nothing more than dogma. Why shouldn’t X’s
looking red represent that X is a typical cause of X’s looking red, or
something along these lines. The representationalist alternative would
then not be an alternative at all; we would be back in the subjectivist
cum dispositionalist camp.17 The representational content in and of
itself would imply that normally causing red sensations was enough
to meet the requirement for being red.
However, representationalism cannot allow that the content of
looking red is in part a matter of looking red itself. One reason is that
experience represents how the world is, not putative facts about
experience itself. That is the lesson of diaphanousness. Another
reason is that such a suggestion would be circular, and viscously so in
the sense of leading to an inﬁnite regress. For representationalists,
there must be a thus and so that X is being represented to be when X
looks red. But if the thus and so is in part that subjects represent that
things are thus and so, we are oﬀ on an inﬁnite regress. The content
cheque can never be cashed.
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NOTES
1 Dispositionalist accounts in the traditional sense of ones in terms of dispositions to
look coloured, as opposed to ones in terms of dispositions to modify light in certain
ways, for example.
2 See, e.g., Jackson and Pargetter (1987) and Jackson (1996).
3 For a recent defence with many references to the literature, see Tye (2000). For
some reservations about the particular version Tye espouses, see Jackson (2004).
With hindsight I regret not believing more of what David Armstrong said many
years ago, starting with Perception and the Physical World (1961) and Bodily
Sensations (1962), although those books pre-date the use of the notion of repre-
sentation as a way of expressing matters. It was reading Lycan (1996) that ﬁnally
converted me to representationalism, although not to quite the kind he avows.
4 There is an interesting generalisation of reﬂectance proﬁles designed to cover, for
instance, objects that are, to one extent or another, transparent, described in Byrne
and Hilbert (2003).
5 I say ‘possibility or apparent possibility’ as some hold views about proper names
that mean that belief that a is F goes along with belief that b is F, whenever a = b.
A recent example is Thau (2002, ch. 4).
6 I borrow the phrase from Foster (2000, p. 105).
7 See, e. g., Jackson and Pettit (1988), but the terminology of course goes back well
before 1988. I am indebted to Andreas Kemmerling for spotting a blunder in an
earlier formulation of the point in the text.
8 In the ﬁnal section I argue that this role cannot, given representationalism, be that
of causing, or typically causing, an F experience.
9 I am here indebted to lunches with Philip Pettit.
10 Armstrong (1968, p. 275) says that ‘our concept of red is all blank or gap’. I think
(hope) this is the same point in other words.
11 Some of my fellow physical realists about colour insist that there is no need to
postulate two properties. But when we believe that ripe tomatoes are red, what
colour do we believe ripe tomatoes to have? Not some colour other than red surely.
But we do not believe them to have such and such a surface reﬂectance property or
anything like that (or need not). So we physical realists had better allow some
property other than having such and such a reﬂectance to be identical with something
that gets a colour name.
12 For a discussion of some alleged counter-examples, see Tye (2000, ch. 4).
13 Thanks here to a discussion with John O’Dea.
14 It is sometimes suggested by qualia realists of a projectivist bent that the property
of the experience and the property that X is represented to have is one and the same.
But this cannot be right for shape and distance away. X will typically be represented
to be a certain shape and distance away, but no-one bar hardline sense datum
theorists (like my former self) think that shape and distance away are properties of
the experience. But the colour is represented to be a property of the very same thing
that is a certain shape and distance away.
15 In the terms ofMoore (1903/1922). Of course, the use of diaphanousness (following,
e.g., Harman, 1990), to argue for the representational cum intentional position) is not
oneMoorewould have accepted. I take the point that immediately follows in the text to
be the oneHarman (1996, §4.1) is making. However, Harman uses representationalism
to defend a version of the via media, if I understand his ﬁnal position aright.
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16 Strictly, there’s a third possibility – that it is indeterminate which of (i) and (ii)
obtains.
17 As David Chalmers pointed out to me.
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